Category: Writing

  • ∆ 3 SYNTHESIS

    ∆ 3 SYNTHESIS — 2nd Draft

    I began with a simple experiment: one image assembling and dissolving pixel by pixel on a small screen, restaged across different media. I was asking whether the digital image could recover a sense of “originality” if it were given an ending, a final destination rather than endless circulation. This framed the image as a finite resource, in which permanence belongs to the origin and transience to the rendering. Soon, however, my interest shifted from making the image physical to defining how, and on what terms, it should end.

    This shift was clarified through what I call obstructed physicality, by which I mean that the digital image is always material, yet its materiality is hidden from view. The philosopher Alessandro Sbordoni supports this, arguing that “representation is a principle that no longer explains the image and its technology away”: the image’s value now lies in its reproducibility, as it is converted into data that makes viewing quantifiable and extractable. Under these conditions, the gaze has been replaced by the stare: endless, habitual and centred on the device. The stare fragments attention, makes images interchangeable and turns viewing itself into data. The gaze restores what the stare removes: an encounter, room for interpretation and a relationship with the image. I therefore asked what conditions an image could set so that it is encountered rather than consumed. Reversing each quality of the stare gave me five counter-conditions (finitude, friction, unmeasurability, situatedness and reciprocity), which I tested through physical computing.

    These experiments culminated in the imagotchi (Δ1): a handheld device holding a single photograph, deleted from its owner’s phone, that loses resolution when neglected and stays whole only through care. The relationship is symbiotic: the image depends on the person’s attention, and the encounter gives back a slower, more deliberate way of looking.

    Writing on artist and writer Hito Steyerl’s “In Defense of the Poor Image” (2009) (Δ2) exposed a tension I had not considered. By treating resolution as the measure of the image’s health, the imagotchi reproduces the class hierarchy of images that Steyerl critiques: rich in resolution and singular in quantity, it risks becoming a luxury object, defined by scarcity rather than care. Yet her later essay “Mean Images” (2023) shows how the circulation she once defended now feeds the extractive economies of AI.

    Artist Trevor Paglen’s “Invisible Images” (2016) extends this: images are increasingly made for machines, optimised to be quantifiable and transparent enough to enter the dataset. Read together, these texts clarify the shared logic of my practice: replacing machinic efficiency with human effort. When an image is incomplete, the effort is imaginative, as the viewer fills in what is missing. In the imagotchi, it is physical and temporal: the image resolves only when someone holds it and stays with it. Both enact what Paglen calls “deliberate inefficiencies”.

    Triangulated, these projects reinforce my commitment to attention, situatedness and care, while untangling care from ownership, and loss from death. Withdrawing a private image from circulation may protect it from extraction, but it may equally produce the rich image in a new form. This leaves me with a sharper question to carry forward: in a culture of hyperconnectivity and constant production, can an image move the viewer from stare to gaze while embracing, rather than resisting, its condition as a poor image? And can such care be shared without relying on circulation?

  • ∆ 3 SYNTHESIS

    ∆ 3 SYNTHESIS — 1st Draft

    At the start of Unit 2, my enquiry concerned the “originality” of the digital image: whether visual disintegration could give an image a final destination and carry it through a complete life cycle. This framed the image as a finite resource, in which permanence belongs to the origin and transience to the rendering. It soon became clear, however, that my interest lay less in physicalising the image than in defining the terms on which a finite image ceases to exist.

    This shift was clarified through the concept of obstructed physicality. As Sbordoni argues, “representation is a principle that no longer explains the image and its technology away”, suggesting that the value of the image now lies in its reproducibility: images are converted into data so that viewing becomes quantifiable and extractable. Under these conditions, the gaze, which involves engagement and invites dialogue, has been replaced by the stare: endless, habitual, quantified and centred on the device. Obstructed physicality can therefore be understood less as an infrastructural change than as the prevailing condition of media consumption. This led to a more precise question: what conditions can an image set for its own viewing, so that it is looked at rather than consumed? I translated the qualities of the stare into counter-conditions (finitude, friction, unmeasurability, situatedness and reciprocity) and tested them through physical computing experiments.

    Reading Paglen’s “Invisible Images” (2016) complicated this further. Images are increasingly made for machines: optimised to be clear, quantifiable and transparent enough to enter the dataset, they no longer simply represent the world but intervene in it. This prompted a second strand of research into the content of the image itself, asking how its subject matter might resist a machinic visual culture that favours seamless, high-resolution perfection.

    Looking across both strands, I recognised a shared logic: each replaces machinic efficiency with human effort. In the first, the effort is imaginative: an incomplete or reduced image requires the viewer to fill in what is missing, keeping its meaning open. In the second, embodied in the imagotchi (Δ1), the effort is physical and temporal: the image resolves only when someone holds it and stays with it, and degrades when that attention lapses. Both enact what Paglen calls “deliberate inefficiencies”: images that slow down and ask something of the person looking.

    Writing on Steyerl’s “In Defense of the Poor Image” (Δ2) exposed a tension I had not considered. By treating resolution as the measure of the image’s health, the imagotchi reproduces the class hierarchy of images that Steyerl critiques. Rich in resolution and singular in quantity, the image risks becoming a luxury object, defined by scarcity and exclusivity rather than care. At the same time, Steyerl’s “Mean Images” (2023) shows how mass production and constant circulation now feed the extractive economies of AI. Withdrawing a private image from circulation may protect it from extraction, but it may equally produce the rich image in a new form.

    Triangulated, these projects reinforce my commitment to attention, situatedness and care, while untangling care from ownership, and loss from death. They leave me with a sharper question to carry forward: in a culture of hyperconnectivity and constant production, can an image move the viewer from stare to gaze while embracing, rather than resisting, its condition as a poor image? And can such care be shared without relying on circulation?

  • Final draft of reference analysis

    Looking at Hito Steyerl’s “In Defense of the Poor Image” from a new angle

    Hito Steyerl opens her essay by calling the poor image an “illicit fifth-generation bastard of an original image.” When I first read it, this phrase made me question the current condition of visual culture, but I don’t think I went deep enough to understand it fully. Returning to it now, after building a device in which an image is designed to die, I find that her essay and my work answer the same question in opposite ways: where, precisely, does the life of an image reside?

    Steyerl’s answer is circulation. Images, she argues, are ranked in a hierarchy based on resolution, in which high resolution becomes a fetish, a marker of completeness and wealth. “Rich” images carry ease and privilege, while cheaper, degraded copies give everyone else a blurry, out-of-focus version of culture. Yet this loss is exactly what makes the poor image democratic. Through compression it becomes accessible and travels beyond its original carrier, gaining an afterlife and finding new meanings as it moves. Works once forgotten or locked away in archives are resurrected online as poor images. The poor image is no longer about the original. It is about its own conditions of existence, and for Steyerl this makes it both resistance and exploitation at once. An image lives in its afterlife: when it stops moving, it stops living. Steyerl doesn’t only argue this; her essay enacts it. Published freely online, it has since circulated as countless PDFs and screenshots, excerpted and reuploaded, open to anyone. The essay has become a poor image of itself, and its reach is its proof.

    My work, imagotchi, was looking for the opposite answer. It cannot be quoted or reuploaded; it resists replication altogether. Instead of spreading across many people, it is designed as a live, limited encounter with one person. In it, an image’s life sits in its resolution and in its place. The person deletes the photo from their phone, so the device keeps the one and only copy. Its resolution is shown as a number on the screen, it loses pixels when neglected, and sharing it makes both copies poorer. Instead of granting the image an afterlife, I give it a limited lifespan, in an attempt to make it more visible and precious. After re-reading Steyerl, I realised what this means. By making resolution the measure of health, I was unconsciously complying with the very class system she describes. In trying to rescue the image from circulation, I adopted the hierarchy that circulation was meant to undo.

    And yet the most important moment in my piece contradicts this. I wanted to design care into the relationship between a person and an image: a reciprocity in which the image’s resolution, and eventually its existence, depends on human attention. When it calls for that attention, and if nobody answers, it loses pixels. This seems to confirm, at first, the superiority of resolution once again. Yet in practice, the intention of it does the opposite. Based on my observations and research, the less defined the image becomes, the more it is cherished, which, for example, can be observed in the family archive images as they gradually deteriorate. Without sharp detail, it leaves a gap for interpretation, drawing the viewer into deciphering and guessing rather than passively consuming a polished image that leaves nothing to imagine. At the very moment the image asks to be looked at, it is a poor image. So in the end, my work agrees with Steyerl more than I expected: losing resolution doesn’t only take something from the image, it also gives something back.

    Yet, in my opinion, our perspectives differ. Steyerl’s argument feels outdated since it was written in 2009, her defence of speed can be explained by the earlier condition of abundance. The speed of transmission that she acknowledged has since become the condition of the stare: images are now consumed as a flow rather than encountered one by one. Following McLuhan’s argument in The Medium Is the Message (1964) that media reshape perception itself, I would argue that this flow has made us less attuned to images, moving our attention from content and intellectual effort to quantity. We now read visual culture in terms of trends and aesthetics rather than as single images. That’s why imagotchi grounds the viewer; its slowness becomes a counter-condition to the mass-produced media. The leap we took from contemplation to distraction, which Steyerl treats with ambivalence, seems like an overlooked condition which became disastrous to image culture.

    Abundance has also produced a culture of permanence: because nothing is ever deleted, we imagine the infrastructure can hold everything. Through weightless metaphors, we built the illusion of a boundless internet, when it is in fact enabled by very physical infrastructure. Steyerl herself later describes the internet spilling offline into the world in “Too Much World: Is the Internet Dead?” (2013). Read today, her proposal to value images as things that lose matter and gain speed strongly comply with the illusion of weightlessness. She writes that the poor image’s “lack of resolution attests to their appropriation and displacement.” Yet I don’t believe an image should be displaced, left in the network with no home of its own. In a culture where nothing is deleted, it begins with a deletion. So, the romanticized perspective on a ‘poor’ wandering image doesn’t feel that plausible anymore.

    Steyerl’s argument feel even less convincing when image at circulation has a new destination. In “Mean Images” (2023), Steyerl describes AI-generated images as statistical median of scraped images taken from training datasets. The movement that gave poor images their afterlife in 2009 now feeds systems that produce polished and biased images. funnily enough that very circulation that once rescued images from the archive, now delivers them to the dataset. This is why my practice looks for counter-conditions to envision a better future through collective speculative practices.

    Placed side by side, Steyerl’s essay and my work demonstrate that the essence or ‘life’ of an image does not solely reside in its speed of circulation or degree of resolution; rather, my central claim is that an image lives in the quality of attention it receives. This argument shifts the question from how best to preserve an image’s wholeness to how the experience of loss might generate engagement rather than erasure. However, this perspective reveals a significant tension within my own practice: removing a private image from circulation could shield it from exploitation, yet may also risk elevating it to the status of an exclusive or privileged object. As such, I am left with more precise questions: Can the intentional design of attention avoid becoming a mere imposition? Is it possible to foster shared care for images, as Steyerl’s poor images do, without relying on circulation? And if it is loss that renders an image visible, should future iterations of imagotchi embrace the condition of the poor image?

    Steyerl’s conception of the poor image emphasizes its vitality through perpetual circulation, embodying a form of agency by remaining in motion. In contrast, my approach centers on the image’s potential to gain significance through stillness, inviting sustained attention rather than passive consumption. By juxtaposing these two positions, it becomes evident that the life of an image may reside not solely in its movement across networks, but also in its capacity to foster meaningful engagement when held in place. This comparison invites further consideration of how images might be designed or curated to elicit genuine care and attention within contemporary visual culture.